We examine the ordering of information within quarterly earnings announcements, and how that ordering influences investor response to those announcements. We find that managers appear to emphasize good news; on average, positive information is concentrated in the first section of the press release, rather than evenly dispersed. This emphasis does not appear to be driven by managerial incentives to manage perceptions. Instead, it appears to be informative: positive information is emphasized more when the expectations gap between the market and managers is positive (i.e., when the market is unduly pessimistic about future earnings). Investors respond to emphasized news -earnings-period returns increase with our measure of emphasis even after controlling for the earnings surprise and the aggregate news in the overall documentalthough that response is incomplete. Our collective evidence suggests that information placement conveys useful information to the market, and that investor response to information placement is warranted, rather than the result of an unintentional cognitive effect.
Introduction
After decades of accounting and finance research analyzing market reactions to earnings news, recent research has begun to analyze the tone and narrative structure of earnings announcements. One conclusion from this literature is that language matters -the tone (i.e., the excess of optimistic over pessimistic language) and opacity of the earnings announcement text is associated with future firm performance and with the market reaction to the earnings press release (e.g., Li 2008; . In other words, managers' language choices convey information beyond that captured by earnings, and investors respond accordingly.
In this paper, we study another aspect of managerial disclosure choice: the decision of what information to emphasize via placement within an earnings announcement. In particular, we ask two questions. First, does the placement of news within an earnings announcement reflect managerial efforts to inform or mislead investors? Second, do investors react appropriately to the news emphasized by managers?
Our study is motivated by the considerable discretion managers have in preparing earnings announcements, and the fact that managers may use this discretion for good or for ill. In the past, many managers used this discretion to emphasize performance measures that presented the firm in a favorable light; for example, by presenting EBITDA or pro forma earnings prominently while demoting the discussion of GAAP earnings until later in the earnings release (Bowen et al. 2005 ).
The SEC's concern about managers abusing this discretion led to Regulation G, which prohibits the presentation of non-GAAP measures in a way that gives them more prominence than GAAP earnings.1 F 2 While managers are no longer able to emphasize non-GAAP measures over their GAAP analogs, they continue to have significant discretion in what they emphasize in the more general language in their earnings announcements. As a consequence, managers can structure their earnings announcements in many different ways: they can choose to discuss positive news before negative news, discuss more important news before less important news, or discuss historical results before forward-looking results, etc. Our interest is in how the relative placement of positive information in earnings announcements influences investors, and whether it should.
We measure variation in information placement based on the extent to which positive information is concentrated in the earliest part of the earnings announcement, rather than being spread evenly throughout the document. Our definition is consistent with the SEC's view that items are more prominent when they are presented earlier in a document.2 F 3 Specifically, we use textual analysis to calculate the net tone of earnings announcements on a sentence-by-sentence basis, and then compare the tone of the earliest sentences to the tone of the sentences in the entire document. We describe earnings announcements as emphasizing positive information when the tone of the earliest portion is greater than the tone of the overall document (i.e., when positive information is concentrated in the earliest portion of the document). This approach allows us to test for the effect of disclosure information placement while holding the language of the document (the net tone) constant.3 F
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We begin by noting that managers, on average, emphasize positive news: the first partition of an earnings press release is, on average, more positive than the overall document. We then investigate the determinants of information placement, with the goal of assessing whether managers place information within a document opportunistically or whether managers use relative placement to inform investors. Based on several proxies for opportunism (e.g., a history of just meeting or beating expectations, the use of abnormally positive language throughout the document, and future restated financial statements), we find no evidence that managers emphasize good news for opportunistic purposes.
In contrast, we find consistent evidence that relative information placement conveys useful information. As expected (and as shown in prior research), the overall tone of the document is more positive when the firm's underlying performance is better. We show that this relation extends to the relative placement of positive language -when managers report good news or when investors are too pessimistic about future earnings, positive information tends to be more concentrated in early portions of the document than when managers report bad news or when investors are too optimistic about future earnings. (Again, this effect is incremental to the net tone of the overall document; our interest is in the placement of news holding constant the inclusion of that news in the disclosure.) We interpret this as evidence that information placement is primarily driven by the economics of the firm, rather than representing an opportunistic tendency to obfuscate bad news.
We next investigate whether investors act as if information placement reflects information content. We find that investors do indeed respond as if the placement of news conveys information -market reactions to earnings announcements are more positive when positive information is presented more prominently (i.e., earlier in the document), even after controlling for the earnings surprise and the net tone of the overall document. This association is consistent with investors interpreting the placement of information as an indication of the importance of that information.
In other words, investors place a greater weight on language that occurs earlier in the document.
Finally, we investigate whether investors overreact or underreact to information placement.
To do so, we examine post-earnings returns (through the subsequent earnings announcement) to assess whether those returns are systematically correlated with the degree to which positive information is emphasized. We find that post-earnings returns are positively correlated with emphasized tone, just as post-earnings returns are positively correlated with the earnings surprise, the tone of the overall document, and the 3-day earnings period return. We interpret this result as evidence that investors do not overweight information located at the beginning of earnings announcements. Instead, the evidence is consistent with a more general underreaction to the information provided at the earnings announcement, whether that information is captured by the earnings surprise, the document's tone, the 3-day returns around the earnings announcement, or our variable of interest -the relative prominence of positive information within the document.
Taken together, our evidence suggests that the placement of information within earnings announcements conveys useful information to the market, and that investors respond to that information, albeit incompletely. Our study adds to the large body of literature related to the structure of financial disclosures, and the placement of information within those disclosures. In particular, our results speak to long-standing regulatory concerns that managers will systematically mislead investors by giving greater prominence to favorable news, while hiding bad news at the end of a disclosure. While we do find that investors are influenced by information placement, our results do not support those concerns. The investor response to emphasized information seems appropriate, given how managers choose to emphasize information in our sample; if anything, investors underreact to the news implicitly conveyed by information placement.
We emphasize three points. First, one of our results -that managers seem to be using information placement to convey a sense of information importance -is particularly noteworthy because of the legal flexibility managers have in choosing the order of their disclosures. Managers face litigation risk when they choose to make more positive statements in their earnings announcements (Rogers et al. 2011 ). However, conditional on the statements they choose to make, managers face very little litigation-based constraints in the ordering of those statements. The fact that managers seem to use their discretion to discuss the most important information first, rather than uniformly presenting the positive information first, suggests that they perceive some other cost (e.g., personal reputation) to engaging in a "focus on the good news first" disclosure policy.
Second, we emphasize a contrast between our study and prior experimental work that focuses on investor response to information placement, particular in terms of our study's implications. Elliott (2006) performs an experiment in which subjects are given earnings announcements that vary in the emphasis of one particular piece of information -pro forma earnings. In that experiment, subjects respond more favorably to disclosures when those disclosures emphasize pro forma earnings relative to GAAP earnings, compared to disclosures emphasizing GAAP earnings relative to pro forma earnings. In other words, she finds, as we do, that information placement/emphasis influences investors. However, where Elliott concludes that her results are driven by unintentional cognitive effects (of the kind fueling regulators' concerns), our empirical setting allows us to not only ask whether investors respond to emphasized information in practice, but also whether that that response is appropriate. By analyzing both investor and manager behavior, we conclude that investor response to emphasized information is not necessarily a sign of suboptimal information processing. Instead, our results point to an equilibrium where investors act as if emphasized information is more important because managers use their discretion to emphasize more important information.
Third, and related to the prior point, our results do not necessarily imply that managers can manipulate investor response by increasing their emphasis on good news. Our results simply say that the current market equilibrium seems to be characterized by: (1) managers who place emphasis on information that warrants emphasis and (2) investors who respond as if managers act that way.
If managers were to begin acting differently, by emphasizing positive information that did not warrant that emphasis, it's an open question whether investors would continue to respond to information placement in the way they currently do, or if they would recognize the change in managers' behavior and treat information placement as effectively uninformative cheap talk.
In the next section, we review relevant literature and develop our hypotheses. In Section 3, we discuss our sample selection and measurement. Section 4 describes our research design and presents our empirical results. We conclude our paper in Section 5.
Prior Research and Hypotheses Development

Prior Literature
Earnings press releases are major news events, and prior literature indicates that the information content of, and the number of words used in, earnings press releases has increased substantially over time (Francis et al. 2002; Landsman and Maydew 2002; ). For example, Francis et al. (2002) show that the number of words used in earnings press releases increased approximately five-fold between 1980 and 1999, while document that the median earnings press release length increased by more than 90 percent from 1998 to 2003.
These and other studies show that qualitative disclosure in earnings press releases convey incremental information about firm performance, and that managers can use qualitative disclosure to influence analyst and investor perceptions of firm value. Specifically, find that the net tone (i.e., net optimistic language) in earnings press releases is positively associated with future return on assets (ROA) and that the tone is positively associated with the stock price reaction to the earnings announcement. They conclude that earnings press release language communicates credible information about expected future firm performance to the market and that the market responds to this information.
Earnings press releases and other financial reports allow for wide latitude in presenting qualitative information. When agency incentives are present, the narrative disclosures of earnings press releases could be used to mislead readers. Prior research finds evidence of opportunistic use of discretion in a variety of contexts. For example, managers are more likely discuss external factors when news is negative, and take credit for results when news is positive (Baginski et al. 2000) . When comparing current results to prior period results, managers strategically choose the prior-period earnings amount representing the lowest benchmark (Schrand and Walther 2000) .
Opportunistic disclosure behavior appears in the use of positive vs. negative language, as well. Tama-Sweet (2014) finds that, when litigation risk is low, managers increase optimism in the tone of an earnings press release prior to exercising options. Similarly, Davis and Tama-Sweet (2012) report more pessimistic tone in the MD&A than in the earnings press release when managers have strong incentives to report strategically. Investors can be misled by opportunistic tone; Huang et al. (2014) show that investors respond to abnormal tone (i.e., positive language not justified by the firm's economic circumstances), which leads to subsequent negative returns.4 F 5 5 While managers have significant discretion in choosing how they describe their firm's performance and outlook, class action securities lawsuits offer one possible constraint. Rogers et al. (2011) show that firms are more likely to be sued when their earnings announcements use more optimistic language. However, we are unaware of any evidence There are a few exceptions, though, and our paper builds on those exceptions. Bowen et al. (2005) examine the level and relative emphasis that managers place on pro forma and GAAP earnings in earnings press releases. They find evidence that managers are deliberate in the metrics they emphasize, focusing on those metrics that are more value relevant and that present the firm's financial performance in a better light. Bowen et al. also find that investors respond to the emphasis, as if they perceive the emphasized metrics to be more important. In an experimental setting, Elliott (2006) shows that emphasizing pro forma earnings led nonprofessional investors' to assess earnings performance as higher. Importantly, Elliott notes that her results "suggest that the influence of pro forma emphasis is the result of an unintentional cognitive effect as opposed to the perceived informativeness of the earnings figure emphasized." (p. 115)
Since the enactment of Regulation G in 2002, firms no longer have the discretion to emphasize non-GAAP metrics in the manner studied by Bowen et al. (2005) and Elliott (2006) .
However, managers continue to have discretion over the qualitative language they use and, in particular, the statements they choose to emphasize via their location in the earnings announcement. To the best of our knowledge, only two recent papers have explored that discretion.
that, conditional on a statement being included in a disclosure, the placement of that statement influences a firm's litigation risk. Huang et al. (2013) (2015) develop a parsimonious measure of narrative structure which they define as the degree to which tone is spread evenly throughout a disclosure versus being concentrated in a few sections of the disclosure. They find that their measure is significantly associated with firm performance and with managers' financial reporting choices. Moreover, they find evidence that the measure is associated with managers' incentives to manage perceptions. Overall, Allee and Deangelis (2015) conclude that managers deliberately structure tone as part of their overall narrative and that a tone word's placement, in addition to its presence or absence, provides insight into the information content of the document.
Our study builds on the Bowen et al. (2005) and Elliott (2006) studies by examining, as they do, whether information placement influences how investors respond to earnings information.
Whereas those papers focus on the relative placement of two specific items -pro forma earnings relative to GAAP earnings -we employ a broader measure of information placement based on the concentration of positive (or negative) information of all types in the early part of the disclosure.
Our study complements Allee and Deangelis (2015) , who also explore the structure of earnings narratives (specifically, conference calls). The difference between the Allee and Deangelis (2015) study and our study is that Allee and Deangelis focus on uniform vs. clustered tone in disclosures, without regard to where those clusters occur. (As they note, their measure "does not capture other characteristics of narrative structure, such as the order in which managers discuss good and bad news" (p. 268)) Our study is directional, in that we expect information at the beginning of the document to be more heavily weighted than information at the end of the document. Our notion of information placement and emphasis also has a direct relation to the regulatory concerns that led to the passage of Regulation G (i.e., that managers were using discretion to emphasize favorable metrics early in their disclosures).
Our study can also be viewed as a qualitative extension of papers that investigate how managers classify quantitative earnings amounts within the Income Statement. For example,
McVay (2006) examines whether managers manipulate the placement of items on the income statement, a setting where the overall information of the statement-net income-is unchanged by where the items are placed. She finds evidence that managers use classification shifting to manipulate their "core" earnings in order to meet analysts' expectations. Our study is similar in that we are holding constant the overall language of the document, and investigating how the structure of that document influences investor response.
Hypothesis Development
We first ask whether the location of news affects investors' responses to an earnings announcement. On one hand, investors could assume that managers adopt the inverted pyramid approach from journalism, where the most important information is presented first, whether that information is positive or negative.5 F 6 If managers adopt this approach, a positive statement presented earlier in the document should receive greater weight than an equally positive statement later in the document. To illustrate, if a firm has a large segment and a small segment, the inverted pyramid approach would mean discussing the results and outlook of the larger segment first.
Positive language about that segment would receive greater weight from investors because that positive language applies to a larger proportion of the firm's overall value.
On the other hand, investors could assume that managers are simply adopting a "good news first" policy. If there are no regulatory or other constraints (e.g., litigation risk or reputational concerns) to discussing positive news first, investors could assume that managers will always choose to discuss positive news first, regardless of whether that news deserves more weight. The empirical results in Huang et al. (2013) suggest that managers are engaging in this type of strategic disclosure, and that such concern would be warranted. In effect, investors would place no extra weight on the more prominently-presented information because they don't view that emphasis as credible. (See, for example, Stocken (2000) and Sobel (1985) .)
We state our first hypothesis in alternative form below, where we use emphasized tone as our measure of information emphasis/placement.
H1: Investors respond to emphasized tone, controlling for the net tone of the entire earnings press release.
We next ask a related question, based on the same arguments. Regardless of how investors perceive emphasized tone, does emphasized tone actually convey incremental information to investors? Our second hypothesis is:
H2: Earnings announcement emphasized tone conveys information about the firm's economics incremental to the net tone of the overall document.
Our third hypothesis links the first and second hypothesis. In effect, we ask whether the investor response (to the extent it exists) is warranted by the information content (to the extent it exists). Investors may suffer from limited attention or other information processing limitations (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003; Elliott 2006) . If so, investors may put more weight on emphasized tone or even overreact to emphasized tone. Alternatively, they may underreact to information in emphasized tone in the same way that investors appear to underreact to earnings news in general (i.e., the post-earnings announcement drift), particularly if they don't find the emphasis credible.
We present our third hypothesis in the null form:
H3: Investors neither under or overreact to emphasized tone.
Sample Selection and Variable Measurement
Sample Selection
We collect quarterly earnings announcements (as filed via 8-Ks) from the SEC EDGAR To ensure the quality of our data, we also test the algorithm on a separate random sample of 100 observations and manually examine parsed sentences to make sure we only keep legitimate sentences from earnings announcements. Next, for each sentence in an earnings announcement, we generate a sentence sequence number that indicates the position of the sentence in the earnings announcement. Finally, we eliminate any earnings press release with fewer than 20 sentences because it is difficult to measure differences in the placement of tone in such a short earnings release. Table 1 , the yearly distribution of earnings announcement is relatively even throughout the sample period. Table 2 shows the characteristics of the firms and earnings announcements in our sample. On average, each earnings press release has about 77 sentences (Document Length). The average 3-day return around an earnings announcement (EA Returns) is 0.17%, while post earnings announcement returns (Post-EA Returns) is 1.62% on average. For firm characteristics, the average market-to-book (MTB) ratio is 2.79, and 23.4% of the earnings announcements report a loss (Loss Ind). Finally, the mean (median) pre-earnings expectation gap (Pre-Earnings Expectation Gap) is -0.34% (0.00%), while the earnings surprise (Earnings Surprise) has a mean (median) of -0.09% (0.05%).
Measuring Emphasized Tone
We measure the tone of each sentence by counting the number of positive words, subtracting the number of negative words, and scaling by the total number of words in the sentence.
We label that measure as net sentence tone. To measure tone emphasis, we first partition each earnings press release into N partitions. For example, for a 75-sentence document broken down into three partitions, the tone of the first partition would be taken from the document's first 25 sentences, the tone of the second partition would be taken from sentences 26-50, and the tone of the third partition would be taken from sentences 51-75. For our main analyses, we compute emphasized tone and present the results based on earnings announcements split into five partitions.8 F
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We calculate emphasized tone as the net tone of the first partition minus the net tone of the overall document. If good news is concentrated in the early (later) part of the earnings press release, emphasized tone will be positive (negative). Figure 1 shows how these positive and negative words are distributed throughout the average document, based on five partitions. The top line illustrates how tone words (whether positive or negative) are distributed. This line shows that tone words are used in about the same amount over the first, second, and third quintiles, then drop in the last two quintiles. In other words, there doesn't appear to be an obvious concentration of tone words in the first quintile.
That interpretation differs when separately measuring positive and negative words.
Positive words (dashed line) are used more frequently in the first quintile, then decline markedly over the remaining partitions. Negative words (dotted line) follow the opposite pattern, appearing less frequently in the first quintile, and then showing up more often later in the document. The effect of this pattern is that, even though tone words are used fairly evenly through the first three quintiles, the net tone of the document declines significantly from beginning to end. This effect is shown in Figure 2 , which shows net tone by partition based on three partitions (solid line), four partitions (dashed line), and five partitions (dotted line). In each case, we document a monotonic decrease in net tone from the first partition to each subsequent partition. Table 2 Panel B shows the summary statistics that underlie Figure 2 . As illustrated in the graph, the earliest part of the earnings announcement tends to be the most optimistic in tone, while the remainder of the document exhibits decreasingly optimistic language. For example, when we split the document into 3 partitions, the first partition, the second partition, and third partition have net tone of 0.33%, 0.04%, and -0.67%, respectively. This preliminary evidence is suggestive of the concerns that drove the SEC to pass Reg G -that firms would choose to emphasize the most positive information by discussing it first. discretion in what they choose to emphasize from one period to the next, compared to how they vary the length or overall tone of the disclosure from one quarter to the next.
Research Design and Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics
To gain further insight about the extent of managerial discretion involved in each of these disclosure attributes, we next regress each disclosure attribute on a variety of fixed effects. Our assumption here is that if disclosure attributes are largely explained by those fixed effects, then the manager is unlikely to be exhibiting significant discretion each period when constructing the earnings announcement.
The results of these regressions are shown in Panel B of Second, industry/calendar quarter fixed effects also explain a meaningful amount of variation in each disclosure attribute. Because firms within an industry in the same period face similar economic circumstances (and potentially similar investor and analyst demand for information),
it's not surprising that they would disclose in similar ways. Third, and most relevant to our study, is that Emphasized Tone is the disclosure attribute that is least explained by the various fixed effects. We view this as supporting evidence for our claim that managers have significant flexibility in how they choose to sequence the information in their earnings announcements. We present the results of our first hypothesis test in Table 5 . Columns (1) and (2) These results indicate that, in addition to the overall tone of the earnings announcement, the placement or emphasis of information has a statistically and economically significant effect on investor interpretation of earnings announcements.
Investors' Response to Information Placement
This outcome is consistent with prior research, both empirical and experimental, that shows investors respond more strongly to pro forma earnings when pro forma earnings are presented more prominently than GAAP earnings (Bowen et al. 2005; Elliott 2006 ). Our next analysis speaks to whether that response is warranted.
Informativeness of Information Placement
We examine our second hypothesis, whether emphasized news conveys information to investors, in several ways. First, we conduct univariate analyses by comparing the emphasized tone in earnings announcements when current earnings reflect good news vs. bad news.
Specifically, we split our sample into good and bad news earnings announcements based on three classifications of good vs. bad news: (i) whether earnings were positive, (ii) whether earnings beat analysts' expectations, and (iii) whether analysts' expectations for next quarter earnings are optimistic or pessimistic. If managers' emphasis reflects informative disclosure, we expect emphasized tone to differ depending on whether managers have good or bad news to disclose. Overall, positive information is more heavily concentrated in the beginning of an earnings announcement when underlying economic news is positive. And we emphasize that all of these figures are conditional on the language in the overall document -this is not a reflection of what firms say in their earnings announcement (which is obviously driven by their economic circumstances), but how they arrange the language within the announcement.
We next examine the determinants of emphasized tone in a multivariate regression: The second group of independent variables consists of "managerial incentives variables", which we use to capture managerial incentives to manipulate market perceptions. Since managerial incentives are not directly observable, we use proxies that prior studies have shown to be associated with the presence of managerial incentives to bias market perceptions upward or downward. We use the occurrence of a future restatement (Future Restatement) since it may suggest that current earnings are manipulated (Huang et al., 2014) . Similarly, we use a just-meet-or-beat indicator (JMBE) because managers may have manipulated earnings to just meet or beat the consensus analyst forecast. Prior research suggests that, when firms report unusually large earnings surprises, managers have incentives to ratchet down market expectations. Therefore, we include an indicator variable representing high earnings surprise (High Earnings Ind) (Allee and Deangelis, 2015) . In addition, Huang et al. (2014) show that managers use abnormally positive language to mislead investors so we include an indicator variable for high abnormal tone (Abnormal Tone Ind). Finally, we control for litigation risk (Litigation_Ind), the difference between non-GAAP earnings and GAAP earnings (NonGaap_Diff), market-to-book ratio (Market-to-Book), leverage (Leverage), net document tone (Net Document Tone), and tone dispersion (Tone Dispersion).
We report the results of our determinants analysis in Table 6 . As shown in Columns (1) - (3), we find emphasized tone is associated with our information variables in the predicted directions. For example, emphasized tone is positively associated with the pre-earnings expectation gap (Pre-Earnings Expectation Gap) and negatively associated with indicator variables that reflect negative earnings surprises and negative earnings (Negative ES Ind and Loss Ind).
In contrast, we find virtually no evidence that any of the four managerial incentives variables (i.e., JMBE, High Earnings Ind, and Abnormal Tone Ind) are associated with emphasized tone. For only one of the variables, JMBE (a history of meeting or beating expectations), is there any statistical significance. (And in that case, the sign of that coefficient is contrary to the conjecture that emphasized tone is associated with managerial incentives to manipulate perceptions.) Overall, the evidence in Figure 3 and Table 6 suggests that managers use emphasized tone to convey useful information and not to manipulate market perceptions.
Under/Over Reaction to Emphasized News
To test Hypothesis 3 and examine whether investors respond to emphasized news appropriately, we use post-earnings announcement returns to investigate whether investors overor underreact to information emphasized by managers. On one hand, if investors face some type of cognitive limitation and put more weight on emphasized tone, they may overreact to emphasized tone. On the other hand, investors may underreact to information in emphasized tone in the same way that they appear to underreact to earnings news in general. If investors over-or underreact to emphasized tone, we expect that over-or under-reaction to correct itself in subsequent periods.
We conduct this analysis using Model (3) Table 5 (EA Returns) in term of economic significance.
Overall, the results in Table 7 indicate that, similar to other measures of information conveyed by the earnings announcement, investors also underreact to emphasized tone. Our interpretation is that investors in general do not overreact to the information in the early part of the document. This finding should alleviate regulators' concern that investors place too much weight on the placement of information within a document.
Additional Analyses and Robustness Tests
We also conduct multiple additional analyses and robustness tests. First, we acknowledge that it is not obvious where to draw the line between the "early" portion of the earnings press release and the remainder. Therefore, to calculate emphasized tone, we employ different partitioning choices (i.e., N=3, 4, and 5) and report the summary statistics of net tone for the different partitions of the document in Table 2 Panel B. For our main analyses, we compute emphasized tone by partitioning earnings announcement into five partitions. In untabulated results, we find that all of our results are qualitatively similar if we compute emphasized tone by partitioning earnings announcement into three or four partitions. Second, we conduct additional analyses following Henry (2008) in determining positive and negative words. We find that our results are very similar if we use this alternative tone words dictionary. Third, Huang et al. (2014) show that investors respond to abnormal tone, defined as residual tone after controlling for economic determinants of tone. All of our results are qualitatively similar if we control for abnormal tone. Fourth, all of our results are robust if we use market adjusted stock returns.
Finally, we control for the presence of forward-looking statements in our sample of earnings press releases. Bozanic et al. (2017) show that the market reaction to earnings press releases increases in the amount of forward-looking statements (sentences containing forwardlooking words such as "target", "predict" or "expect") contained in the press release. If managers choose to emphasize forward-looking disclosures in press releases, our proxy for information placement could be confounded by the type of information being presented. We define a variable (Document FLS) as the number of forward-looking words in the press release scaled by total words in the press release. Untabulated results show that, consistent with Bozanic et al. (2017) , more forward-looking content is associated with greater, absolute earnings announcement returns. More importantly, controlling for forward-looking statements does not change the relation between announcement returns and Emphasized Tone which continues to be positive and significant. Thus, our results are robust to controlling for the extent of forward-looking information in the document.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examine how the placement of information within earnings announcements affects investor response to those earnings announcements. Our study takes into account the fact that managers have significant discretion over relative emphasis on various items within the earnings announcement, and that managerial choices will inherently be interrelated with investor response. Specifically, we examine whether managers emphasize good news by placing it early in an earnings press release and whether this emphasis misleads or informs investors. We define a measure of news placement ("emphasized" tone) as the net tone of the first partition of the document minus the net tone of the overall document and examine whether emphasized tone affects investor response to the announcement.
First, we find that managers, on average, emphasize good news: the tone of earlier sections of the release is more positive than the tone of the overall document. Second, we find that investors respond to news that is emphasized by being placed early in a document: earnings announcement returns are positively associated with emphasized tone, even after controlling for the tone of the entire document. We then show that managers' placement choices convey useful information about firms' future performance. Specifically, we find that emphasized tone is more positive (negative) when the document reports positive (negative) earnings, a positive (a negative) earnings surprise, or when the expectations gap between the market and managers (proxied by the next quarter's analyst forecast error) is positive (negative).
These results suggest that, on average, managers use their discretion to emphasize information based on how important or relevant that information is, rather than whether that information conveys good or bad news. Finally, our results indicate that investors underreact (not overreact) to information emphasized by managers. Taken together, our evidence suggests that managers use information placement to convey useful information to the market and that investors do not inappropriately overweight that emphasized information.
While our results suggest that investors are not misled by managers' information placement (a common concern of regulators), they also suggest that investors do not fully understand the implications of managers' placement of information within earnings press releases. Future research can investigate determinants of this underreaction (for example, it may be due to limited attention of the type in Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003) . Another area of interest is the type of information emphasized by managers. While historical earnings news is the primary focus of earnings press releases, these documents also contain forward-looking information and a mix of quantitative and qualitative measures. Whether the choice of historical versus forward-looking information or quantitative versus qualitative language affects investors is another area for future research.
Appendix: Variable Definitions Variable Definition
Abnormal Tone
A measure of residual net tone of the earnings announcement that is not explained by the firm's economic circumstances following Huang et al. (2014) .
Abnormal Tone Ind
An indicator variable set equal to 1 if the abnormal tone is in the highest decile of the calendar quarter, and 0 otherwise.
Document Length
The total number of sentences in the earnings announcement release.
Document FLS
The total number of forward-looking words scaled by the total number of words in the earnings announcement. The forwardlooking words are computed following Bozanic, Roulstone, and Van Buskirk (2017) .
EA Returns
3-day earnings announcement returns.
Earnings Surprise
Actual EPS less than IBES consensus (mean) expectations, deflated by the stock price two trading days prior to the earnings announcement.
Earnings Volatility
Standard deviation of quarterly earnings over the last 12 quarters.
Emphasized Tone
The net tone of the first of N partitions (N=3, 4, or 5) minus the net tone of the overall document, where net tone of the first partition is computed as the total number of positive words minus the total number of negative words in the first partition then scaled by the total number of words in the first partition. For our main analyses, we compute Emphasized Tone by partitioning earnings announcement into 5 partitions.
Future Restatement
An indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm's quarterly or annual earnings is restated in the future periods, and 0 otherwise.
High Earnings Ind
An indicator variable set equal to 1 if the actual EPS less than consensus expectations is in the highest decile of the calendar quarter, and 0 otherwise.
JMBE
An indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm just met or beat the consensus analyst forecast (0<=(actual-medest)<0.01), and 0 otherwise.
Appendix: Variable Definitions (Continued)
Lag Returns
The market returns of the firm in quarter t-1.
Lag Returns Volatility
The standard deviation of daily market returns of the firm in quarter t-1.
Leverage
Total liabilities divided by total assets.
Litigation Ind
An indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm is in the biotech (SIC codes 2833-2836 and 8731-8734), computer (3570-3577 and 7370-7374) , electronics (3600-3674), or retail (5200-5961) industry, and 0 otherwise.
Loss Ind
An indicator variable set equal to 1 if the quarterly earnings is negative, and 0 otherwise.
Market Value
The natural log of market value of the firm.
Market-to-Book
The market to book ratio, defined as market value of equity scaled by book value of equity.
Negative Earnings Surprise
Actual EPS less than IBES consensus (mean) expectations, deflated by the stock price two trading days prior to the earnings announcement. This variable is set to 0 if the earnings surprise is positive.
Negative ES Ind
An indicator variable set equal to 1 if the earnings surprise is negative, and 0 otherwise.
Net Document Tone
The total number of positive words minus the total number of negative words then scaled by the total number of words in the earnings announcement. The positive and negative words are computed following Loughran and McDonald (2011) .
NonGaap Diff
The difference between non-GAAP earnings (Operating Income After Depreciation) and GAAP earnings (Net Income), scaled by total assets.
Post-EA Returns
The returns beginning on trading day +2 relative to the current earnings announcement, and ending on the first trading day after the subsequent earnings announcement.
Pre-Earnings Expectations Gap
The difference between period t+1 earnings and analysts' estimates of t+1 earnings, where the estimates are measured prior to the period t earnings announcement.
Tone Dispersion
The standard deviation of net sentence tone of the earnings announcement, where net sentence tone is computed as the number of positive words minus the number of negative words in the sentence then scaled by the total number of words in the sentence. The dependent variable is 3-day earnings announcement returns (EA Returns). The independent variable of interest is Emphasized Tone which is defined as the net tone of the first partition minus the net tone of the overall document. All regressions include calendar quarter fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. In Column (3), all independent variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Standard errors are The dependent variable is Emphasized Tone which is defined as the net tone of the first partition minus the net tone of the overall document. The independent variables of interest are "information variables" (Pre-Earnings Expectation Gap, Earnings Surprise, Negative ES Ind, and Loss Ind) and "managerial incentives variables" (Future Restatement, JMBE, High Earnings Ind, and Abnormal Tone Ind) . All regressions include calendar quarter fixed effects and firm fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented below the coefficients. *, **, *** Denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. See the Appendix for variable definitions. The dependent variable is Post-EA Returns, i.e., the returns beginning on trading day +2 relative to the current earnings announcement, and ending on the first trading day after the subsequent earnings announcement. The independent variable of interest is Emphasized Tone which is defined as the net tone of the first partition minus the net tone of the overall document. All regressions include calendar quarter fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed for brevity. In Column (3), all independent variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented below the coefficients. Standard errors are clustered by firm and presented below the coefficients. *, **, *** Denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. See the Appendix for variable definitions.
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